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Saturday, August 16, 2008

The Lost Territory of British Cameroons and The Haunting Problem of Bakassi

By Mola NJOH LITUMBE, Senior Cameroonian Citizen, Politician & Opinion Leader

On 13 December 1946 Her Majesty’s Government of Great Britain executed a Trust Agreement over a clearly defined territory known as British Cameroons. A similar Agreement was executed with France over the neighbouring territory of French Cameroun. The terms of the trust agreements were similar, for the Administering Authorities (viz Britain and France) contracted to prepare the respective trust territories and their inhabitants to self-government or independence pursuant to Art 76b of the UN Charter which states as follows:

“76b. to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement.”

2. In conformity with the UN Trust Agreement over French Cameroun, France granted independence to French Cameroun on 1 January, 1960 under the baptismal name of La Republique du Cameroun (LRC). Consistent with international law, the boundaries of the new corporate state of La Republique du Cameroun were those inherited from France, and as specified in the trust Agreement of December 1946 with the UN.

3. It is an incontestable fact that no portion of the trust territory of British Cameroons was part of French Cameroun when the latter was granted independence on 1st January 1960. Therefore, subsequent to its independence, for LRC to enlarge its territorial boundaries to incorporate any portion of British Cameroons, it could only do so in accordance with international law, viz. by the prescriptions of the UN Charter to which it was subject from the moment it was admitted a member of the UN on 20 Sept. 1960.

Art. 102 of the UN Charter is the governing authority on the matter and it states thus:

“(1) Every Treaty and every international agreement entered into by any member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the secretariat {of the UN} and published by it.”

“(2) No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.”

4. Clearly, therefore, LRC cannot validly claim sovereignty over any part of Br Cameroons in the absence of a Union Treaty with Southern Cameroons duly filed at the Secretariat of the United Nations. Worse, as the International Court of Justice is an organ of the United Nations, the case against Nigeria over Bakassi that is located in Southern Cameroons should never have been entertained by the ICJ, in the absence of a Union Treaty (between LRC and Southern Cameroons), duly filed at the Secretariat of the UN. Such a treaty does not in fact exist, so the proceedings before the ICJ were patently misconceived, thus making void all consequential decisions based on a clear violation of the UN Charter, including the obnoxious Greentree Accord.

5. At its 160th plenary meeting on 18 November 1948, (viz. subsequent to the execution of the Trusteeship Agreements in December 1946) by Res. 224(III), the UN General Assembly resolved inter alia:

“Noting that the Trusteeship Agreements for some of these territories authorize the Administering Authority concerned to constitute the Territory into a customs, fiscal or administrative union or federation with adjacent territories under its sovereignty or control and to establish common services between the Trust Territory and such adjacent territories, where such measures are not inconsistent with the basic objectives of the Trusteeship System and with the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement, .....

“Recalling that the General Assembly approved these Agreements upon the assurance of the Administering Powers that they do not consider the terms of the relevant articles in the Trusteeship Agreements as giving powers to the Administering Authority to establish any form of political association between the Trust Territories respectively administered by them and adjacent territories which would involve annexation of the of the Trust Territories in any sense or would have the effect of extinguishing their status as Trust Territories .....

“Recommends accordingly that the Trusteeship Council should:

(c) Request whenever appropriate, an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice as to whether such unions are within the scope of and compatible with the stipulations of the Charter and terms of the Trusteeship Agreements as approved by the General Assembly …..”

6. From the foregoing resolution, Britain was authorized to administer the UN trust territory of British Cameroons from its adjacent colony or protectorate of Nigeria, and to divide the trust territory to suit its administrative convenience, but if it came to ceding any portion of the trust territory permanently to Nigeria, the opinion of the International Court of Justice was to be sought as to whether this was within the scope of and compatible with the UN Charter and the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement. (As it later transpired, inspite of this restriction, Britain, the Administering Authority, permanently converted its administrative divisions into permanent demarcations of the one trust territory, and would appear to have misled the UN in this regard).

7. By 1960 the United Nations was determined to eradicate colonialism in all its facets, so by Resolution 1514 of 12 December 1960, it stipulated as follows in parts:

“#3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.

“#5. Immediate steps shall be taken in trust territories, non-self governing territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories without any conditions or reservations in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire without any distinction as to race, creed or color, in order to enable them enjoy complete independence and freedom.”

“#6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”

8. From the foregoing Resolution, independence was to be granted unconditionally to the non-self-governing territory and people of Br Cameroons, in much the same way as for French Cameroun (which at the material time of its independence was engaged in a bloody civil war), without the pretext of inadequacy of financial resources as Britain claimed. However three days later, on 15 December 1960, the United Nations passed Resolution 1541((XV) to take care of such an objection. The Resolution clearly stated that short of gaining outright independence, a non-self-governing territory could attain a full measure of self-government by voluntarily associating or integrating (on terms) with an already independent state, thus:

“A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government by:

    1. Emergence as a sovereign independent State;
    2. Free association with an independent State; or
    3. Integration with an independent State.”

9. All three key players, viz. Britain the Administering Authority, Nigeria and LRC, as members of the United Nations, participated in the passing of the above resolution, so they all understood that since Br Cameroons was denied outright independence, it could aspire to a full measure of self-government only by free association or integration with an independent state (not states). As the founding fathers in Br Cameroons acceded to having their full measure of self-government that way, rather than demand outright independence which they could have insisted upon, and actually participated in a plebiscite to ascertain whether they wished to attain independence by joining either Nigeria or LRC, I am driven to the conclusion that, although the founding fathers were obviously coerced by the Administering Authority, they nevertheless thereby exercised their right of self-determination.

10. Based on the above understanding with the founding fathers of Br Cameroons, a plebiscite was conducted throughout the national territory on 11/12 February 1961. The inhabitants were given two alternatives of voting to achieve independence (a full measure of self-government) either by joining Nigeria or LRC. Following are the official results of the plebiscite:

Votes Cast in For joining Nigeria For joining LRC

Northern Cameroons 146,296 97,659

Southern Cameroons 97,741 233,571

--------- ----------

244,037 331,230

====== ======

42.42% 57.58%

It is obvious from the above result that the majority of the inhabitants of Br Cameroons opted to join LRC at independence. However their democratic decision was aborted, thereby making it impossible for the trust territory as a whole to exercise the option of joining either Nigeria or LRC as stated in the two alternatives, and as required by UN Res. 1514(#6).

11. It is difficult to comprehend how the democratic intention of the inhabitants of the territory entrusted to Britain could express themselves democratically in any political consultation, without tallying the votes of the voting population in the whole territory. Br Cameroons was one trust territory that had defined international boundaries, while its division into Northern and Southern Cameroons was a domestic arrangement to suit the convenience of the Administering Authority that governed the territory from different parts of its colony of Nigeria. As far as I have been able to ascertain, there is no UN Resolution splitting the territory into two, to have justified the results of the plebiscite being separately proclaimed for different parts of the same territory covered by one trust Agreement. Where there was doubt, the matter should have been referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion, pursuant to UN Resolution 224(III) of 18 November 1948 mentioned in para 4 above. This was never done.

12. The plebiscite result was no more than a declaration of intent, but the political Union had to be consummated by going through the statutory modalities contained in Art. 102 of the UN Charter. In the particular case of Southern Cameroons, the UN prescribed the following specific procedures in para 5 of Res. 1608(XV) of 21 Apr 1961 which was to constitute the Certificate evidencing the political wedlock of LRC to Southern Cameroons, and of course file a copy of the Agreement at the UN Secretariat:

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“5. Invites the Administering Authority, the Government of the Southern Cameroons and Republic of Cameroun to initiate urgent discussions with a view to finalizing, before 1 October 1961, the arrangements by which the agreed and declared policies of the parties concerned will be implemented.”

13. In the absence of a Union Treaty and with the indecent haste with which the Administering Authority, at the terminal stage of its trust mandate, deserted Br Cameroons, LRC simply moved in its forces and annexed the territory of Southern Cameroons, and for close to half a century LRC has made no attempt to respect the special status of the joining UN trust territory of Southern Cameroons, as prescribed by UN Resolution 1541(XV) which laid down the terms under which a non-self-governing territory could be associated or integrated with an already sovereign state, and notwithstanding that the relevant UN Resolution was passed with LRC participating. The conclusion to be drawn is that it is LRC that needs to amend its ways, and not Southern Cameroonians who are seeking their legitimate fundamental entrenched rights.

14. For there to be a divorce, the parties concerned have first to be married, otherwise the association of the parties cannot be referred to as a marriage. Lately, it has been reported that same sex couples have come out of their closets in some countries after many years of co-habitation and jubilantly celebrated marriage as soon as the law allowed them to do so, meaning that they accept that their relationship until then, was not legal. The situation of LRC with Southern Cameroons is a similar closet relationship that cannot be legally countenanced under the UN Charter. To the extent to which Southern Cameroons was not part of corporate LRC at the latter’s accession to independence on 1 January 1960, any notion of secession is misconceived, in the absence of a Union Treaty. The situation is similar to one of the parties in a co-habitation arrangement suing for “divorce” when the other partner decides to leave. To call the separation a divorce, the party so saying must be able to produce a marriage certificate. In the instant case, there is no such evidence between LRC and Southern Cameroons.

15. The onus is upon LRC to respect the provisions of UN Res. 1541(XV) which it participated in passing, otherwise it must accept full responsibility upon Southern Cameroons deciding to opt out of a political co-habitation that has been discriminatory and a total disaster. Southern Cameroonians had been lured to believe that the union was to be a two-state federation of equal status, consistent with integration as defined in UN Res. 1541(XV) option (c). LRC on the other hand understood that it was taking back a portion of its “former” territory. There was no consensus ad idem between the parties, so there is no contract that justifies the misplaced notion of secession which implies seeking to break away from the territory of corporate La Republique du Cameroun as internationally constituted on 1st January, 1960.

16. Annexation of Southern Cameroons by LRC is further proved by the so-called Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, which is the instrument which purported to unite the Republic of Cameroon with Southern Cameroons as from 1st October, 1961. A close examination of this statute shows that it was debated and passed in the Parliament of La Republique du Cameroon, and promulgated into law by President Ahmadou Ahidjo, President of La Republique du Cameroun (LRC) on 1st September 1961. At this material date Southern Cameroons was still a UN trust territory, took no part in the debate of the bill, and in any event it was the British Administering Authority’s resident Commissioner in Buea who held executive power to commit the UN trust territory of Southern Cameroons.

17. With there being no valid treaty of Union between LRC and Southern Cameroons, the change of name in the Parliament of LRC from La Republique du Cameroon to Republique Federale du Cameroun was purely a cosmetic change of name of the same country and had no bearing whatsoever to the neighbouring UN trust territory of Southern Cameroons, but was a smokescreen to pave the way for the annexation of Southern Cameroons on 1st October 1961 when the British Administering Authority left Southern Cameroons unceremoniously without first yielding the instruments of power to the Government of Southern Cameroons. The current situation is that the UN trust territory of Southern Cameroons, endowed with enshrined international prerogatives on the terms of joining a sovereign state as spelt out in UN Res. 1541(XV), has instead been annexed and assimilated by LRC, wiped out from the world map, and reduced to two of LRC’s ten provinces. The international community resisted Iraq’s attempt to annex Kuwait, and is hereby invited to do the same in this case. Either La Republique du Cameroun respects its obligations under the UN Charter in so far as Southern Cameroons is concerned, or it must peacefully let the people of Southern Cameroons go their separate way.

Conclusion

18. Recent upheavals in Bakassi are a pointer that the turmoil there should be speedily resolved by a judicious settlement of the Southern Cameroons problem. The matter is not one which could be settled by a municipal court, so to avoid a situation which might disturb regional and world peace, only a member of the UN that has locus at the International Court of Justice, particularly Britain, Nigeria, LRC or even the Trusteeship Council, should seize the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion as to whether or not the UN trust territory of British Cameroons, or any part thereof, attained independence in accordance with Art 76b of the UN Charter, or otherwise pursuant to UN General Assembly Resolution 1541(XV). There is precedent in this regard when the ICJ was seized by Liberia and Ethiopia for an opinion as to whether the governance of South-West Africa, another former German territory, by the then Apartheid South Africa, was in accordance with international law. The opinion of the ICJ helped propel the independence process of Namibia.

19. France has recently indicated it would lend support to La Republique du Cameroun to defend its foothold in Bakassi, but the truth of the matter is that the territory of Bakassi does not belong to either Nigeria or La Republique du Cameroun. It is Southern Cameroons territory, and the recent statement by France is troubling, as it might lead to a senseless war.

20. It is entirely possible to resolve this matter peacefully via the International Court of Justice, and so save the needless loss of lives we are now experiencing due to imperialistic greed for Bakassi oil and its other natural resources.

21. My humble plea to any state that has locus at the International Court of Justice, is to summon courage and seek the Court’s advisory opinion, and so save us from another disaster in Africa, for ominous clouds are gathering in the political landscape over Bakassi.
Buea, 30th July, 2008


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